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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the impact of advanced countries’ quantitative easing on emerging 
market economies (EMEs) and how macroprudential policy and good governance play a role 
in preventing potential financial vulnerabilities. We used confidential locational bank statistics 
data from the Bank for International Settlements to examine whether quantitative easing has 
caused an appreciation of EMEs’ currencies and how it has done so, and whether this has  
in turn boosted foreign-currency borrowing, thus making EMEs vulnerable to balance sheet 
and maturity mismatch problems. While focusing our analysis on East Asian economies,  
we compare them with Latin American economies, which were also major recipients of 
quantitative easing capital inflows. We found that government effectiveness plays an 
important role in curbing excessive borrowing when the exchange rate is overvalued. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The quantitative easing of advanced economies’ central banks in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis (GFC)—the Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank, 
the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan in particular—have contributed to large-
scale capital inflows to emerging market economies (EMEs), including those in East 
Asia. While the capital surge into EMEs underpinned financial stability of EMEs to 
some extent, for some EMEs, capital inflows turned out to be pro-cyclical, causing 
asset bubbles and appreciation of exchange rates. This posed a new challenge to 
monetary policy.  
For example, Brazilian President Rousseff in 2012 mentioned that a “monetary 
tsunami” was making its way to EMEs. India’s Central Bank Governor Raghuram Rajan 
(2013) called for “prudent measures” to avoid an excess buildup of credit. Indeed, 
given the volatile nature of short-term capital flows and the danger of sudden stops 
(reversals of capital flows), many EMEs implemented macroprudential policies and 
(sometimes temporary) measures of capital account restrictions to better cope with 
capital flows. The speed at which the direction of flows can change was illustrated  
by Fed Chairman Bernanke’s “tamper talk,” which, just by expectation, prompted a 
reversal of capital flows in some EMEs and stirred fear of financial instability in a 
number of EMEs. 
Figure 1 shows annual percentage change in global liquidity—defined here as  
cross-border capital flow (debt securities and bank credit). While a sharp reversal of 
capital flows occurred during the GFC, the growth in cross-border capital flow in United 
States (US) dollars turned positive as early as December 2008. However, the growth  
of cross-country bank and debt securities capital flows are still lower than they were 
before the GFC, demonstrating the severe abundance of global liquidity before  
the GFC. 
Figure 1: Percentage Change in Cross-Border Credit (Debt Securities  
and Bank Lending by Major Currencies) (US$ trillion) 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. Global Liquidity Indicators. Table E-1. http://www.bis.org/statistics/gli.htm 
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Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the impact of quantitative easing of major 
advanced economies on foreign-currency borrowing of EMEs in East Asia to examine  
if quantitative easings had led EMEs to overborrow. In particular, it focuses on the role 
of institutions in dealing with capital account management and macroprudential policies 
adopted by East Asian EMEs1 in response to capital inflows. Of the different types of 
capital inflows, we focus on cross-border bank lending, using data from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) that consist of comprehensive lending information 
including details on currency breakdown. While the paper focuses on EMEs in 
East Asia, we compare our findings with Latin American countries.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper focuses on how EMEs responded to capital inflows, particular in the form  
of cross-border bank borrowing, seeing if and how the prudential policies and 
institutional setting dampened the foreign exchange borrowing caused by exchange 
rate appreciation. As a meta-survey by Frankel and Saravelos (2010) shows, a surge in 
capital inflows and real exchange rate appreciation (especially the short-term “hot 
money” flows) are among the most reliable early warning indicators of a financial crisis. 
Hence, preventing overborrowing is an important element in preventing financial crisis. 
2.1 Some Features of Cross-Border Bank Lending in Emerging 
Market Economies 
The literature finds that the quantitative easing spillover and its determinants are no 
different from conventional monetary easing (Glick and Leduc 2013). The stance of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the quantitative easing spillover to EMEs is 
overall positive, albeit with some nuances: quantitative easing not only supported 
EMEs by preventing the contagion-driven market meltdown, but also underpinned their 
growth. At the same time, the IMF expressed concern about the consequences of  
a prolonged period of capital inflows and cheap foreign financing for future financial 
stability. Indeed, in many EMEs, we observed a rapid expansion of credit, which 
historically has been followed by a period of financial instability (Schularick and 
Taylor 2012).  
Typically, EMEs cannot borrow their own currency in cross-border borrowing, a 
phenomenon that has been referred to as the “original sin” problem (Eichengreen, 
Hausmann, and Panizza 2003). While some EMEs, as a result of the “catching-up” 
process, are able to raise funds in their own currencies (the recent launch of the 
renminbi bond index in the London Stock market is a good example), there are 
reasons, especially at the micro level, why agents in EMEs prefer borrowing in foreign 
currencies, especially in the dollar. First, many developing countries depend on 
commodity exports as their main source of revenue; since commodities are almost 
exclusively priced in the dollar, exporters in those countries prefer to use the dollar 
rather than local currencies in their transactions (Frankel and Saiki 2002). Even if they 
are exporting industrial goods because of the lower pricing power of exporters and the 
thin financial markets, they tend to price in the importers’ currency (Goldberg and Tille 
2009; Friberg and Wilander 2008). Finally, when EMEs trade with each other, the dollar 
1 Our sample of “East Asian countries” includes India. India is not part of East Asia, but we included it in 
our analysis as it is one of the countries that experienced a quantitative-easing monetary “tsunami” and 
took several measures to combat it, especially under its Central Bank Governor Rajan.  
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is often used because of its role as the world’s vehicle currency. The need to settle 
trade in dollars makes them prefer dollar debt to home currency debt. 
Compared with advanced countries, EMEs typically suffer from poor protection of 
property rights and corruption. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) claimed 
that the currency mismatch problem and institutional weakness (they call it the “debt-
intolerance” school) are analytically distinct. We need to bridge the two by looking at 
how a country’s prudent behavior, or a good institution in a broader sense, would make 
a country less vulnerable to the currency mismatch problem that led to balance-of-
payments crises in EMEs in the past. In other words, we think a prudent government 
will not overborrow in foreign currencies.  
2.2 Currency Appreciation and Borrowing Behaviors  
Rajan (2013) claimed that strong currency and asset prices reduce agents’ loan-to-
value ratios, which lessens perceived risks of the leverage. This often feeds into an 
oversupply of credit from  cross-border lending, which sometimes results in balance-of-
payment problems. Against this backdrop, Rajan called on EMEs to design and 
implement prudential policy, the effectiveness and efficacy of which has not yet been 
strongly established in the literature. 
The meltdown of foreign-currency debt overhang has been well noted in in the past 
(Latin America’s Tequila Crisis, Asian currency crisis, etc.). In floating exchange rate 
regime countries, such as Poland and Hungary, the expectation of continuing 
appreciation has led them to borrow heavily in euro and in Swiss franc, which was 
pegged to the euro between September 2011 and January 2015. During the GFC, the 
Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint depreciated by almost 65% vis-à-vis the euro and 
20% vis-à-vis the Swiss franc. This increased the foreign-currency loans of Hungary to 
47% of gross domestic product (GDP) (of which 31% was denominated in Swiss 
francs) and 16% of GDP in Poland. Afterward, these two countries put macroprudential 
tools in place. Arteta (2005) found that floating exchange rate regime countries are 
more likely to deposit or borrow in the US dollar, because floating regimes are 
positively associated with deposit dollarization more strongly as investors seek to keep 
their asset value stable in US dollar terms. However, a stronger home currency will 
make it easier for EMEs to borrow in a foreign currency. To the best of our knowledge, 
no studies have so far assessed how the valuation of exchange rates is related to 
foreign bank lending, and how they interact with institutions and macroprudential 
measures. Overall, existing literature seems to imply that foreign-currency lending 
and/or borrowing (“financial dollarization”) can be detrimental to an economy. Some go 
one step further and suggest that it was one of the main causes of the GFC (Akca 
2011). 
3. STYLIZED FACTS 
Before going into the formal analysis, it may be useful to see some stylized facts 
concerning the GFC and the various quantitative easings that followed. Since we are 
particularly interested in the effect of exchange rate appreciation, and possibly 
overvaluation, in what follows we examine the actual data of capital flow exchange 
fluctuations of major EMEs (not just East Asian EMEs) around the time of the GFC and 
subsequent quantitative easing policies.  
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3.1 Capital Flows 
Figure 2 shows both gross and net capital inflows to selected East Asian countries.2 
After the start of quantitative easing in 2008, we can see an increase in portfolio 
inflows, in terms of both gross and net. However, EMEs became disproportionally 
(relative to their economic size) large recipients of capital inflows in the run up to the 
GFC even in net terms (not reported in the graph). This indicates that, when the GFC 
hit their currencies, these countries were likely to have suffered from a currency 
mismatch problem. According to the updated systemic banking crisis database (Laeven 
and Valencia 2012), the following EME countries experienced currency crises after 
2007: Belarus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Serbia, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, Serbia, Ukraine, and Zambia.  
Figure 2: Net and Gross Capital Flows to East Asia 
 
Note: The total capital flow to India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics. 
The plunge of capital flows to East Asian economies during the GFC was less severe 
compared with other EMEs because of several factors, mainly: macroeconomic 
management by central banks, strong economic fundamentals and high levels of 
financial reserves, and geographic proximity to the People’s Republic of China with its 
2  We also included India in our baseline sample. Strictly speaking, India is not geographically categorized 
under East Asia, but because of its experience in receiving quantitative easing spillover money and 
capital openness, as well as the various macroprudential policy (MPP) measures it has taken, we 
included it in our list of sample countries. 
4 
 
                                               
ADBI Working Paper 604 Saiki, Chantapacdepong, and Volz 
 
high economic growth rate. Nevertheless, with greater financial integration, the external 
economic environment has a growing impact on the domestic economy.  
3.2 Exchange Rates  
Figure 3a shows our measurement of exchange rate valuation, which is discussed in 
the next chapter. Figure 3b shows the real effective exchange rate (consumer price 
index [CPI] based) from the BIS. 
Figure 3(a): Exchange Rate vis-à-vis the US$ of Selected EMEs 
 
Figure 3(b): Real Effective Exchange Rate of Selected EMEs 
 
EME = emerging market economy, REER = real effective exchange rate. 
Notes: 
1.  In Figure 3(a), the higher value means greater overvaluation. 
2.  In Figure 3(a), the degree of overvaluation is calculated by the authors. See Chapter 4 for explanation. 
3.  The value reported is the average for the following countries:  
 Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. 
 Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Russian 
Federation. 
 East Asia: India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
 Others: South Africa and Turkey. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
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Roughly speaking, currency overvaluations of selected Asian countries were severe 
before the Asian currency crisis in 1997, but not so much before the GFC when global 
liquidity was very high probably due to their active management of exchange rate.  
On the contrary, the exchange rates of Latin America, South Africa, and Turkey  
have been relatively more overvalued. Looking at the development of real effective 
exchange rate (REER), Latin American countries tend to have higher REER than the 
rest of the EMEs, and the REER of the Eastern European countries has been 
appreciating.  
4. THE ROLE OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY  
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Macroprudential thinking begins with the observation that the whole of the financial 
system is more than the sum of the parts. – Jeffrey Frankel (2015) 
4.1 Macroprudential Measures 
The idea of macroprudential policy is not new. According to Galati and Moessner 
(2013) the word and concept were already used in an undisclosed document of the BIS 
in the late 1970s, which defined it as “a systematic orientation of regulation and 
supervision linked to the macroeconomy.” 
Macroprudential policies take macroeconomic cycles into consideration and deploy 
countercyclical policy. Examples include cyclically varying provisioning requirements, 
cyclically varying loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, countercyclical capital buffers, 
capital/liquidity surcharges/levies on systemically important financial institutions, taxes 
on volatile funding, caps on credit growth, and higher reserve requirements (Ostry et al. 
2011). Before the GFC, monetary authorities tried to maintain financial stability mainly 
through microprudential policies, which aim to cope with idiosyncratic risks of individual 
financial institutions and mitigate externalities arising from the behavior of individual 
institutions (such as the forward-looking provisioning of expected losses, caps on  
LTV ratios or minimum collateral haircuts, higher-risk weights on specific types of 
exposures, and leverage ratios (Ostry et al. 2011).  
The GFC made it clear that microprudential policy alone is not sufficient to maintain 
financial stability, as financial institutions are interconnected in a very complex manner. 
In addition, traditional monetary policy (changing interest rates, money supply, etc.) 
affects not only the finance sector but also non-finance sectors, including households. 
On the other hand, macroprudential measures are more targeted to the finance sector 
and look at the finance sector as a whole, rather than the individual financial institution. 
There are some overlapping aspects of macroprudential policy (MPP) and capital flow 
management (CFM).3 However, Forbes, Fratzscher, and Straub (2015) claimed that 
since capital restriction measures do not discriminate among different measures—they 
may hurt some lenders (such as small and medium-sized enterprises) who are actually 
in need of foreign money. They also argued that capital flow restrictions suffer from 
leakage, making MPPs a preferable option, as these are more targeted to the finance 
3 CFM refers to measures that are designed to limit capital flows. It aims to discourage transactions in 
foreign currency as well as residency-based capital flow management measures. The form and extent 
of CFM in Asia has varied widely, reflecting three main issues: (i) the limit to macroeconomic policy 
adjustment each economy faced, (ii) the specific finance sector pressures each economy faced, and  
(iii) concerns about the volatility of inflows. 
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sector. Overall, they concluded that MPPs are a better tool to employ when there is a 
massive inflow of capital, especially when it is a pro-cyclical one. There is a caveat, 
however. MPP also can “leak” via regulatory arbitrage—so international coordination is 
an urgent task. 
In much of the earlier literature it was argued that capital flow restrictions alone can be 
welfare reducing (e.g., Fischer 1998) while more recent literature (Korinek 2010; 
Bianchi 2011) showed that carefully calibrated MPP can increase welfare under certain 
circumstances. Technically, one MPP tool to deal with cross-capital inflows involves the 
ratio of foreign-currency debt: for example, restricting agents to borrow in foreign 
currencies, especially mortgage loans, or higher requirements for the foreign reserve 
ratio of commercial banks (Frankel 2015). 
4.2 Macroprudential Policy Implementations in East Asia  
and Other Emerging Market Economies 
Appendix 4 shows capital inflow and outflow openness of the selected countries 
(Schindler’s index), along with the IMF’s macroprudential index (MPI). There is an 
interesting pattern across different regions: in East Asia, although some economies 
became more restrictive toward capital flows after the Asian crisis in 1997, MPPs  
were strengthened, both after the Asian crisis and the start of quantitative easing  
in advanced economies. Latin American countries, especially Brazil, reacted to 
quantitative easing spillover by restricting capital flows, especially outflows. Economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe loosened capital flow restriction but strengthened  
MPP measures.  
Pradan et al. (2011) summarized the tools of MPP and CFM of selected East Asian 
countries, along with their motivation and objectives. They found that (i) the MPP and 
CFM stances vary significantly among East Asian countries, partly due to the fact that 
some East Asian economies (such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore) with an open 
capital account and an exchange rate targeting and/or currency board system cannot 
have independent monetary policy (“impossible trinity”). These countries mostly used 
MPP instruments, such as caps on LTV ratios and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, as well 
as tax measures. The Republic of Korea, an East Asian economy with relatively high 
financial development, has been an active user of both MPP and CFM. Banks in the 
Republic of Korea have high exposure to short-term external debt because of growing 
demand for foreign exchange derivative transactions. Financial imbalances have 
emerged among domestic banks as well as in foreign exchange transactions, along 
with the housing boom. Thus, the Republic of Korea implemented MPPs for property 
financing. It also imposed a levy on bank non-deposit foreign exchange liabilities and a 
ceiling on bank foreign exchange derivative positions to deter speculative flows.Korea 
also implemented the CFM measure to deter foreign fund flows into their bond market. 
On the other hand, developing East Asian economies such as the People’s Republic  
of China and India have a relatively closed capital account, which has enabled them  
to rely heavily on traditional monetary policy tools like reserve requirement ratios  
and some housing measures. The economies of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) have relied on a mixture of traditional monetary policy tools, MPP, 
and CFM, which can complement each other. Indonesia and Thailand introduced 
restrictions on non-residence access to the domestic bond market, minimum bond 
holding periods, and withholding tax on bonds as part of their CFMs.  
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Data: Sources and Summary Statistics 
Appendix 1 lists our sample countries and their regional classifications. Most 
importantly, our baseline East Asian countries are current members of ASEAN and the 
so-called “four tigers.” We exclude the PRC as a unique case (very fast growth and 
restricted financial activities) and Hong Kong, China because it is classified as a tax 
haven by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),  
and because it provides a loophole of speculative money in and out of the People’s 
Republic of China. This makes our baseline East Asian economies as follows:  
Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; India; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic; Malaysia; Myanmar; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; 
Thailand; and Viet Nam. This is based primarily on ASEAN plus Singapore and the 
Republic of Korea, which were affected by capital inflows after the quantitative easings. 
We excluded the People’s Republic of China because its domestic financial market  
is heavily regulated and highly distorted, and its capital market is still very closed—
therefore, there is strong pressure to circumvent the restriction to invest in foreign 
countries for higher returns. We did not include Hong Kong, China because it is a 
global banking center, often acting as a gateway of the People’s Republic of China’s 
capital inflow and outflow, and it is designated as a tax haven by the OECD.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Growth per Region Quinn’s Capital Openness Measure 
 
2000 2005 2012 
 
2000 2005 2012 
Baseline East Asia 7.0 6.4 5.1 Baseline East Asia 52.9 53.8 72.2 
Developing Europe 5.4 7.3 2.5 Developing Europe 60.3 67.4 85.4 
Latin America 2.8 4.9 2.9 Latin America 79.7 77.1 77.9 
South Asia 5.5 5.3 5.9 South Asia 40.0 37.5 41.7 
MENA 4.5 5.7 9.9 MENA 58.7 64.4 73.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.5 5.2 3.7 Sub-Saharan Africa 59.0 59.0 71.6 
Non-OECD Members 4.1 5.5 4.3 Non-OECD Members 97.2 97.2 98.9 
OECD Members 4.3 2.5 0.0 OECD Members 61.5 62.2 73.5 
Macroprudential Index Institutional Quality 
 
2000 2005 2012 
 
2000 2005 2012 
Baseline East Asia 1.1 1.9 2.8 Baseline East Asia –0.2 –0.1 0.0 
Developing Europe 0.9 1.6 2.7 Developing Europe –0.2 –0.5 –0.4 
Latin America 1.9 2.7 3.2 Latin America –0.3 –0.6 –0.6 
South Asia 1.8 2.5 3.3 South Asia –0.6 –0.6 –0.5 
MENA 1.6 1.9 2.8 MENA –0.4 –0.1 –0.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.8 1.0 1.4 Sub-Saharan Africa –0.7 –0.5 –0.6 
Non-OECD Members 1.3 1.9 2.6 Non-OECD Members –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 
OECD Members 0.9 0.9 1.8 OECD Members 1.4 1.3 1.4 
MENA = Middle East and North America, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Note: For institutional quality, a higher number means better quality.   
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators; Quinn’s Capital Openness 
Measure; Macroprudential Index by the International Monetary Fund; and Institutional Quality (see main text  
for definition). 
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To get a better perspective, rather than simply focusing on East Asia, we compare 
other EMEs for key macroeconomic and institutional variables in Table 1. These 
groups are mutually exclusive, i.e., a country belongs to only one regional group. The 
definition of “developed” and “developing (EME)” countries follows the World Bank’s 
definition. For the rest of this paper, we chose Latin American countries (see 
Appendix 1 for the full list) for the comparison group. As commonly known, baseline 
East Asia enjoyed a constant relatively high growth over the sample period, while its 
capital openness is lower and its institutional quality is better than other developing 
countries. As Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2015) pointed out, the MPP is used 
more often in developing countries than in advanced countries (see Table 1, lower 
left panel). 
In Table 2, we show the correlation of key variables on the cross-section basis as of 
2005. Capital openness measures have a high correlation with institutional quality. In 
particular, the correlation with the legal institutional quality is as high as about 0.5 for 
both Quinn and Chinn–Ito’s capital openness measures. Financial openness has been 
documented to have a close connection with governance. For this reason, we analyze 
the role of capital openness separately from governance.  
Table 2: Correlation of Capital Openness, Governance, and Real GDP per Capita 
 Quinn Chinn–
Ito 
WB–
EDB 
MPI Fin. Depth RGDPPC 
Quinn’s Measure: Capital Openness (Quinn) 1.00      
Chinn–Ito Capital Openness Index 0.91 1.00     
Government Effectiveness (WB–EDB) 0.52 0.46 1.00    
Macroprudential Index (MPI) –0.54 –0.42 –0.34 1.00   
Financial Depth 0.51 0.50 0.83 –0.29 1.00  
Real GDP per Capita 0.51 0.50 0.83 –0.29 0.35 1.00 
GDP = gross domestic product, WB–EDB = World Bank—Ease of Doing Business.  
Source: Authors. 
5.2 Variables 
We used a panel regression model with annual data covering the period 2001–2013  
for Asian EMEs (excluding low-income countries with an income per capita of less  
than US$1,460 per year as defined by the World Bank). Appendix 2 lists the variables, 
definitions, and the sources. 
5.2.1 Cross-Border Borrowing in Foreign Currency (Dependent Variable) 
Our dependent variables are annual change of cross-border lending in foreign 
currencies (in net terms) and exchange rate-adjusted change. The source is a 
confidential version of the BIS locational banking statistics. This dataset comprises 
loans—both in gross and net terms—of BIS reporting banks to the rest of the world  
(on a country level). We use the residential base version of cross-border lending data, 
which is broken down by currencies (lender’s currency versus borrower’s currency). In 
our analysis, we used the BIS reporting banks’ cross-border lending to Asian EMEs in 
lender’s currency (i.e., for borrowing EMEs, it is a foreign currency). 
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The original source is on a quarterly basis, but because quarterly frequency data for 
other key variables (especially the governance and capital openness data) 4  were 
lacking, we summed the change over four quarters and defined it as an annual change. 
The data enable us to break down, among other things, currency composition (i.e., 
lender’s currency versus borrower’s currency) of bank lending. Since interbank lending 
and/or borrowing contains overnight market activities, or to cover the cash shortage on 
a very short-term basis, we focus on cross-border lending to non-bank sectors in the 
lender’s currency. In what follows, we explain the variables of interest.  
We assume that, other things being equal, countries with strong institutional settings 
will attract more capital (because of more reliable rule of law, enforcement of  
contracts, etc.).  
5.2.2 Currency Valuation 
Exchange rate appreciation would also make the borrower’s currency stronger vis-à-vis 
the borrowing currencies, thus a borrower has more incentive to borrow in lender’s 
currency, while a lender has more incentive to lend as the borrower’s balance sheet 
(asset side) looks strong.5 
However, when the home currency depreciates, a currency crisis occurs and 
companies and household become over-leveraged. 
Although there is no consensus on how to measure the “equilibrium” value of exchange 
rates, the traditional approach to gauge real exchange rate overvaluation is as follows: ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = ln 𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡  [1] 
XRAT is the nominal exchange rate, and PPP is the purchasing power parity conversion 
factor (both from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database). The 
rough interpretation is that if the log of the ratio of nominal exchange rate (local 
currency per foreign) to PPP conversion factor is greater than 0, the currency is 
undervalued, and vice versa. However, this suffers from the Balassa–Samuelson effect 
(Frankel 2006), which is one of the first studies to stress the importance of including the 
GDP per capita into the exchange rate valuation. Thus, following Frankel (2006) and 
Rodrik (2008), we regress this traditional measure of overvaluation on real GDP per 
capita (in natural logs) with year fixed effects in panel-data setting, and take the error 
term ε as the measure of undervaluation:  
𝑙𝑛 �
𝑋𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 � = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, [2] 
RGDPCH is GDP per capita. We confirm that the error term is normally distributed.  
We define negative values of the residual as the degrees of undervaluation after 
controlling for the Balassa–Samuelson effect. Since we are interested in the effect of 
overvaluation, we use –𝜀𝑖,𝑡, as our measure of overvaluation. 
4 The Quinn’s openness measure is based on the qualitative information of the IMF’s Annual Report  
on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions, which measures the financial openness  
as of the end of the respective year. This makes conversion of the annual data to quarterly data 
quantitatively difficult. Also, empirically, this means that it is appropriate to take one lag for the capital 
openness measure. 
5 Shin (2015) pointed out that exchange rate appreciation is becoming expansionary, not contractionary 
as the traditional Mundell–Fleming model claims, because the financial channel is dominating the  
goods channel.  
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5.2.3 Macroprudential Index 
Another key variable we brought into our model is the MPI developed by Cerutti, 
Claessens, and Laeven (2015). This dataset covers 119 countries over 2000–2013. 
The MPI covers many instruments such as loan-to-value ratio, reserve requirements, 
and debt-to-income ratio. We use the borrower-targeted macroprudential tool index 
(henceforth BTM), as it is heavily used in East Asia. The higher the MPI, the more 
macroprudential measures are in place and/or strictly implemented. This is based  
on the IMF’s Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments survey of each country’s 
executives (Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven 2015). The MPI is the  
sum of a (different combination of) binary valuation of 12 tools (LTV, DTI, etc.). As 
mentioned above, EMEs employ MPIs more frequently than advanced countries, and 
MPIs are less effective for countries with more open and deeper financial markets  
(as one will find in advanced economies), because there is more room for regulatory 
arbitrage, i.e., investors simply investing somewhere else. This is also in line with the 
argument of Engel (2015), who stressed the importance of international coordination in 
macroprudential policies. However, the very nature of MPP—tied to the economic cycle 
of an individual country—makes it very difficult to coordinate the policy across 
countries. Although Cerutti’s database was the first attempt to comprehensively 
quantify macroprudential measures, it has some shortcomings, which may be improved 
in future versions. First, it only targets domestic (residence based) banks (not 
insurance companies, hedge funds, shadow banking, etc.). Second, it is a binary 
variable (1 when the measure is in place, 0 otherwise), so it fails to capture the reach 
and depth of its implementation and enforcement, let alone efficacy. 6 Various MPP 
measures were taken in East Asian EMEs, in different forms, and often combined with 
capital flow measures, but LTV is the most frequently used measure in East Asia  
(for details, see Lee, Asuncion, and Kim 2015).  
Macroprudential policies can be divided into borrower-based (caps on LTV and DTI 
ratio) and lender-based, but it has been shown that for East Asia, borrower-based 
income has been used extensively and showed some impact (Cerutti, Claessens, and 
Laeven 2015; Bruno, Shim, and Shin 2015). 
5.2.4 Institutional Quality Database 
Among the various indicators for institutional quality, the most popular one is the 
International Country Risk Group database. But in 1997 the World Bank started issuing 
its own estimations of institutional quality (now called Ease of Doing Business [World 
Bank EDB]). It was published biannually until 2002, and annually thereafter. We use 
this World Bank measure as it is more focused on economic factors, rather than the 
International Country Risk Group index, which contains many other factors such as 
crime rate and ethnic tensions.7 
The World Bank data consist of several components that mainly relate to business 
climate (getting credit, tax systems, etc.). Here, we use the government’s effectiveness 
as strong legal framework and enforcement are relevant for overseeing and regulating, 
if necessary, cross-border lending. The indicator is compiled from many sources, such 
as the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Asian Development Bank, and defined as 
“capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
6 The measures developed by Bruno, Shim, and Shin (2015) also capture the scope of each instrument, 
but as the sample size is rather small (60 countries), we use the index of Cerutti, Claessens, and 
Laeven (2015). 
7 That said, there is a very high correlation between these two measures. (The correlation between the 
principal component of ase of Doing BusinessT and our measure is 0.97). 
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and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality  
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies” (World Bank, Doing Business). The credibility and 
commitment of public institutions are at the core of this index. This can also be 
interpreted as how prudent the government is perceived to be.  
A strong institutional and governance framework helps MPPs to be more effective, as 
good governance would result in a healthy central bank, regulatory authorities, and 
relevant government institutions via strength of powers and clear accountability (IMF 
2013). Numerous studies have been done on the positive relationship between good 
governance and per capita income growth especially for lower-income countries; 
however, to the best of our knowledge, no scholarly studies examine how institutional 
factors would safeguard financial stability. In Appendix 5, we present the mean and  
± 2 standard deviations of baseline Asia and Latin America. On average, baseline  
Asia has higher government effectiveness, but perhaps because of a smaller sample 
size compared with Latin American countries, the standard deviation is higher for 
baseline Asia. 
5.2.5 Other Variables 
We also included other variables to control country-specific factors that affect  
cross-border foreign-currency borrowing by EMEs such as financial depth; the real 
interest rate differential from the United States benchmark rate; economic cycle;  
stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) per GDP; trade openness defined as (export  
+ import)/GDP; global liquidity (source: BIS) defined as total credit outstanding of 
international banks; and VIX (the Chicago Board Options Exchange [CBOE] Volatility 
Index). The source and description are presented in Appendix 2.  
6. MODEL 
Because of the weakness of the MPI as discussed above, we included the government 
effectiveness index to measure a government’s prudency. The basic idea is that a 
prudent government would closely monitor foreign-currency liabilities and take effective 
actions. Our model is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡  
∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜷𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 [3] 
Y is the annual change in foreign-currency cross-border borrowing (exchange rate 
adjusted, BIS reporting banks’ lending to sample countries in lender’s currency) per 
GDP of the recipient country.  
We used clustered standard errors (country level) to allow for unobserved correlation  
in errors within a country: if we do not control this, the standard errors would be 
underestimated and the significance overestimated (Baum, Nichols, and Schaffer 
2011). We conducted a panel unit-root test to make sure that all the variables used are 
stationary. We divided samples into two time periods: (i) the pre-quantitative easing 
period (2001–2007, so-called “global saving glut” period); and (ii) the quantitative 
easing period (2008–2013). The sample period is divided this way because, before the 
GFC, capital was flowing from emerging economies to advanced economies (Lucas 
paradox), largely to the US, fueling housing bubbles, which was a major contributor to 
the GFC. As discussed, global liquidity after the quantitative easing started was still 
high, but it is a result of quantitative easing policy, so the source of global liquidity was 
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very different. Going further, global liquidity is likely to decline as the Fed’s monetary 
policy has been in a tightening cycle since December 2015. More importantly, after the 
quantitative easing started, the capital flow reversed—it is now flowing from advanced 
economies to EMEs.  
Dividing our sample into these two periods gives us a clear picture of how EMEs coped 
with capital inflows as a result of quantitative easing. We looked at selected East Asian 
countries (“Baseline East Asia”) and Latin American countries (for comparison). We 
excluded banking centers and tax haven countries (Appendix 3) from our sample,  
as capital flows to these countries are driven by different motives, rather than 
macroeconomic fundamentals or institutions. 
Second, we looked at the role of capital openness, using Quinn’s measure of  
capital openness.8 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜷𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 [4] 
Further, to test the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, we use the MPI (borrower’s 
component) by Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2015). 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜷𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 [5] 
7. RESULTS  
Table 3 presents the estimation results (columns 3 and 4 for pre-crisis and post-crisis 
East Asia, and columns 7 and 8 for Latin America). Interestingly, capital openness  
is negative, perhaps because this is net bank lending. One potential explanation is  
that countries with open capital markets like Singapore (a BIS-reporting country) was 
lending to other countries. Or, more capital-open countries have better governance  
(as we saw in the correlation table), so the respective government was taking 
measures to stop excessive capital inflows, which leads to an asset bubble. For the 
MPI, as we predicted from the shortcomings of the data discussed above, we did  
not get significant results. The coefficients of overvaluation and its cross-term with 
MPI–BTM are significant before the crisis, possibly indicating that the MPI was actively 
employed before the crisis in East Asia. Since we are interested in how our  
sample countries reacted to quantitative easing, we look at the second column. There, 
we can clearly see the negative correlation between government effectiveness  
and foreign-currency cross-border borrowing. Notably, the cross-term between 
overvaluation and government effectiveness has been negative and statistically 
significant for both regions since 2008. This indicates that the incentive to borrow in 
foreign currency when the home currency is strong was reduced probably because 
efficient governments take action against overborrowing. 
  
8 We did not use the Chinn–Ito index because it is slow moving by design (because of its 5-year average 
calculation), and it does not capture the sudden change in capital flow management policy, which 
frequently occurred during this period. Since the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, on which Quinn’s measure is based, takes the snapshot of capital openness at 
the end of the year (December every year), we take a lag of capital openness. 
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Table 3: Cross-Country Foreign Currency Borrowing  
and the Role of Good Governance and Capital Openness 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 Baseline Asia Pre-crisis 
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.00615 0.00871 0.00505 0.0200 
[.9393] [1.074] [.4148] [.6874] 
Government effectiveness –0.00508 –0.00779**   
[–1.569] [–2.263]   
Overvaluation x Government 
effectiveness 
0.00164 –0.0189**   
[.2866] [–1.974]   
Quinn’s capital opennness  
(1 lag) 
  –0.000119* –0.0000807 
  [–1.791] [–.6344] 
Overvaluation x Quinn’s 
capital opennness (1 lag) 
  0.0000386 –0.000428 
  [.1934] [–.7332] 
Financial depth 0.0000474 0.000104*** –0.0000363 0.0000385 
 [1.227] [3.281] [–1.242] [1.287] 
Interest rate difference from 
the US real interest rate 
0.000121 0.000106 –0.0000791 0.000127 
[.5008] [1.239] [–.5839] [.2708] 
Cycle (HP filtered) 0.177* 0.0267 0.142 0.0990* 
[1.781] [.4919] [1.296] [1.83] 
FDI per GDP 0.0000136 0.0000678*** 0.0000321 –0.0000124 
[.5503] [2.812] [.9941] [–.2617] 
Trade Openness 
(EX+IM)/GDP 
0.00000779 –0.0000716*** –0.0000126 –0.0000157 
[.646] [–4.022] [–.7218] [–.539] 
Global Liquidity 0.00230 0.0102 0.00590 0.0132 
[.7563] [.9556] [1.477] [.7094] 
VIX –0.000347 –0.00162 0.0000215 –0.00192 
[–1.512] [–.9399] [0.1065] [–.6882] 
Number of observations 63 40 64 30 
R-squared 0.2866 0.2269 0.29 0.2085 
 [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Latin America Pre-crisis 
Exchange rate overvaluation –0.0173 –0.198** 0.0119 –0.0265 
[–1.01] [–2.155] [.9112] [–.3333] 
Government effectiveness 0.00691 –0.00209   
[.6764] [–.075]   
Overvaluation x Government 
effectiveness 
0.0135 –0.402***   
[.7469] [–2.956]   
Quinn’s capital opennness  
(1 lag) 
  –0.00000408 –0.000632** 
  [–.0372] [–2.078] 
Overvaluation x Quinn’s 
capital opennness (1 lag) 
  0.00000495 0.000444 
  [.0336] [.3713] 
continued on next page 
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Table 3 continued 
 [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Latin America Pre-crisis 
Financial depth 0.000138 0.000328 0.000160 –0.000402 
[.3954] [.3513] [.7414] [–1.096] 
Interest rate difference from 
the US real interest rate 
–0.000102 –0.000372 –0.0000807 0.00191** 
[–.3819] [–.4387] [–.3803] [2.525] 
Cycle (HP filtered) 0.133 0.0760 0.00973 –0.380 
[.8202] [.2004] [.1046] [–.5783] 
FDI per GDP 0.00000620 0.000117 0.000231 0.000655 
[.0516] [.4348] [.8417] [1.154] 
Trade Openness 
(EX+IM)/GDP 
0.0000892 –0.000101 0.000151 0.00147*** 
[.5917] [–.2596] [1.011] [4.019] 
Global Liquidity 0.00678 0.0292 0.00300 –0.00536 
[.7523] [.7572] [.3872] [–.4698] 
VIX –0.00129 –0.00448 –0.00136 –0.00224* 
[–1.373] [–.9272] [–1.233] [–1.862] 
Number of observations 132 85 132 53 
R-squared 0.0816 0.372 0.1446 0.6341 
Cycle (HP filtered) = HP-filtered cycle of log of real GDP in local currency term (lambda: 6.25), EX = export,  
FDI = foreign direct investment, Financial depth = domestic private credit to the real sector by deposit money banks as 
percentage of local currency, GDP = gross domestic product, IM = import, VIX = CBOE Volatility Index. 
Notes:  
1.  t statistics in brackets. 
2.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
3.  Raw data from the World Bank; Bank for International Settlements; International Monetary Fund-International 
Financial Statistics; Federal Reserve Economic Data database; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; Dharmapala and Hines (2006); and Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2015).  
Source: Authors.  
Table 4: Coss-Country Foreign Currency Borrowing  
and the Role of Macroprudential Index 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
Baseline Asia Latin America 
  Pre-crisis After Crisis Pre-crisis After Crisis 
Overvaluation 0.0101* –0.00128 –0.00445 0.0511 
[1.702] [–.1716] [–.3389] [.8074] 
MPI-BTM 
(Borrower targeted measure) 
0.00431 –0.00113 0.00470 0.00403 
[1.01] [–.2173] [.9968] [.4823] 
MPI-BTM x Overvaluation –0.0177* –0.00130 0.0194 0.000373 
[–1.706] [–.2235] [.9287] [.0079] 
Real interest rate difference 
from the US 
0.000320** 0.000146 –0.00000784 –0.000578 
[2.083] [1.339] [–.0422] [–1.317] 
HP filtered cycle 0.164 0.0159 0.315 0.0970 
[1.552] [.288] [.7779] [.3392] 
FDI per GDP 0.0000206 0.0000313 0.0000223 0.0000271 
[.6761] [.6469] [.1327] [.1097] 
continued on next page 
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Table 4 continued 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
Baseline Asia Latin America 
  Pre-crisis After Crisis Pre-crisis After Crisis 
Trade (EX+IM)/GDP –0.0000360 –0.0000502 –0.0000235 –0.0000412 
[–1.501] [–1.058] [–.2981] [–.295] 
Financial depth –0.0000655 0.0000634 –0.000386 –0.000450 
[–.8639] [.7187] [–1.208] [–.7609] 
log(logal liquidity) 0.00433 0.0113 0.00463 0.0515 
[1.191] [.8392] [.5754] [1.01] 
VIX –0.0000637 –0.00190 0.000166 –0.00596 
[–.5255] [–.8081] [1.038] [–.9354] 
R-squared 0.3581 0.1987 0.1057 0.1101 
Observation 64 36 94 54 
Cycle (HP filtered) = HP-filtered cycle of log of real GDP in local currency term (lambda: 6.25), EX = export,  
FDI = foreign direct investment, Financial depth = domestic private credit to the real sector by deposit money banks as 
percentage of local currency, GDP = gross domestic product, IM= import, VIX = CBOE Volatility Index. 
Notes:  
1.  t statistics in brackets. 
2.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
3.  Raw data from the World Bank; Bank for International Settlements; International Monetary Fund-International 
Financial Statistics; Federal Reserve Economic Data database; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; Dharmapala and Hines (2006); and Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2015).   
Source: Authors. 
Figure 4: The Coefficients of Interactive Term  
(overvaluation × governance) 
 
Source: Authors. 
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Interpreting the coefficients on cross-terms of two continuous variables—governance 
and overvaluation—requires caution, as the coefficients would change as the value of 
either continuous variable changes. To check this, we drew a scatter plot (Figure 4). 
The line denotes the coefficient, and the x-axis and y-axis denote two continuous 
variables. The dotted line shows values of two standard deviations. From the graph, 
the significance is clearly robust to different values of either one of the continuous 
variables. This means that more effective governments curbed cross-border foreign-
currency borrowing. Government effectiveness itself was only significant for East Asia 
after the crisis, indicating a more proactive approach on the government side. For the 
MPI, we observed a significant effect only before quantitative easing for East Asia.  
This may be a result of the government’s ongoing effort to prevent a repeat of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis. Before the GFC, East Asia was facing high pressure of capital 
inflow because of its robust economic growth. But this needs further examination. 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper, we looked into the role, governance, and macroprudential measures to 
deal with cross-border bank lending to EMEs against the backdrop of quantitative 
easing of advanced economies. In this context, we paid particular attention to the effect 
of quantitative easing-related capital inflows on exchange rate valuations and foreign-
currency borrowing of EMEs. We also investigated the role of institutions to curb 
overborrowing in foreign currencies. Our key findings are as follows: (i) After the GFC, 
there is a clear indication that a more effective government can curb foreign-currency 
borrowing; this holds in East Asia and Latin America; and (ii) East Asian countries have 
been more proactive in responding to excessive credit buildup, i.e., the overvaluation 
effect on foreign-currency borrowing. The policy implication is that, since East Asia has 
a higher score in government effectiveness, it is less likely, especially compared with 
Latin American countries, to suffer from the negative result of overborrowing (currency 
mismatch, sudden stop, balance-of-payment crisis, etc.) in the near future.  
In sum, countries with good governance and the right macroprudential measures in 
place are less likely to suffer from currency mismatch as well as deleveraging as a 
result of overborrowing in foreign currencies.   
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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE DATA COUNTRIES  
Baseline East Asia Latin America 
Brunei Darussalam 
Cambodia 
India 
Indonesia 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Philippines 
Republic of Korea 
Singapore 
Taipei,China 
Viet Nam 
Argentina 
Barbados 
Belize 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
St. Vincent and Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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APPENDIX 2: VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
Net foreign currency 
borrowing 
Exchange rate adjusted change in net cross-border 
borrowing from BIS reporting bank countries in lender’s 
currency, on residential basis. 
BIS Locational Banking 
Statistics 
Overvaluation See equation [1] in the main text for the definition Calculated based on data 
from the World Bank WDI 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the governments 
commitment to such policies. 
The World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business 
Financial Depth Domestic private credit to the real sector by deposit 
money banks as percentage of local currency GDP 
World Bank WDI 
Interest Rate relative to 
US 
Real interest rate of home country minus US real interest 
rate 
IMF–IFS 
HP-filtered cycle HP filtered cycle of log of real GDP in local currency term 
(lambda: 6.25) 
World Bank WDI 
FDI/GDP Inflow of FDI divided by GDP World Bank WDI 
(EX+IM)/GDP Exports and Imports divided by GDP (Trade openness) World Bank WDI 
Log (Global Liquidity) Global credit it aggregates (banks + nonbanks) BIS Global liquidity database 
VIX CBOE Volatility Index FRED database 
Offshore Offshore market according to OECD definition OECD 
Tax Haven Tax Haven Dharmapala and Hines (2006) 
MPIBTM Borrower targeted macroprudential measure Cerutti et al. (2015) 
BIS =  Bank for International Settlements, WDI = World Development Indicators, US = United States, IMF = International 
Monetary Fund, IFS = International Financial Statistics, HP = Hodrick-Prescott, GDP = gross domestic product, FDI = 
foreign direct investment, VIX = Implied volatility of S&P500 index, CBOE = Chicago Board Options Exchange, FRED = 
FRED economic data by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, MPIBTM = Borrower targeted macroprudential measure. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF TAX HAVENS AND BANKING 
CENTER COUNTRIES 
Tax Havens Banking Center 
Andorra 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Babuda 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Channel 
Cook Islands 
Cyprus 
Dominica 
Gibraltar 
Grenada 
Hong Kong, China 
Ireland 
Isle of Man 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Maldives 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Monaco 
Montserrat 
Netherlands Antilles 
Panama 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Vincent and Grenadines 
Seychelles 
Singapore 
Turks and Islands 
Vanuatu 
Ireland 
Liberia 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Panama 
Samoa 
Salomon Ireland 
Singapore 
South Sudan 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Switzerland 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Note: See Dharmapala and Hines (2006) for a definition of “tax havens” and Quinn et al. (2011) for “banking center.” 
Sources: Dharmapala and Hines (2006); and Quinn et al. (2011). 
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APPENDIX 4: CAPITAL INFLOWS–OUTFLOW 
RESTRICTION MEASURES AND MACROPRUDENTIAL 
INDEX 
East Asia and India 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure continued 
 
continued on next page 
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Latin America 
 
continued on next page 
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Emerging Europe 
 
MPI = macroprudential index, RHS = right-hand side. 
Note: Higher capital index corresponds to higher restriction.   
Source: International Monetary Fund Schindler’s Index and Macroprudential Index.  
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APPENDIX 5: GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
SCORES OF SAMPLE COUNTRIES (BASELINE ASIA 
AND LATIN AMERICA, MEAN AND ± 2 STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business. 
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